PODCAST: The Supreme Court and the “Independent State Legislature Theory”: A Discussion with Nicholas Maggio

Summary: In Moore v. Harper, decided last year, the Supreme Court addressed the “independent state legislature theory.”  In a case arising out of an election in North Carolina, proponents of the theory contended that North Carolina’s Supreme Court did not have the authority to review a legal claim that the state legislature had adopted an illegally gerrymandered congressional map.  The Supreme Court rejected the theory by a 6-3 vote in Moore.  In this Touro Law Review podcast, Nicholas Maggio, an attorney who has written about the independent state legislature theory, discusses the case – in particular, its relevance during an election year and its significance for understanding the current Supreme Court – with Associate Dean Rodger Citron. 

Brought to you by the Touro Law Review.   

Learn more about Nicholas Maggio

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PODCAST: A Discussion of A Civil Action

Jonathan Harr’s, A Civil Action, published in 1995, is one of the best nonfiction legal thrillers ever written. It tells the riveting story of a complicated civil suit over environmental pollution that occurred in Woburn, Massachusetts. Not surprisingly, Harr’s book was adapted into a film of the same name that was released in 1998. John Travolta played the plaintiffs’ lawyer, Jan Schlichtmann, a character worthy of Shakespeare. Robert Duvall nearly steals the film as Jerry Facher, the lawyer for one of the corporate defendants.

Nearly 25 years later, the film is still a gold mine for Civil Procedure professors. In his review, Roger Ebert described A Civil Action as “John Grisham for grownups.” Schlichtmann is relentless in pursuing the case against the defendants, becoming so invested that nothing else seems to matter – an approach that has significant consequences for everyone around him as the case turns into an interminable trial. Facher, meanwhile, is a master litigator who wrings every advantage from the rules and courtroom procedures.

In this podcast, Associate Dean Rodger Citron moderates a discussion of A Civil Action with his colleagues Laura Dooley and Deseriee Kennedy.

Brought to you by the Touro Law Review

Our guests today are Professor Laura Dooley and Professor Deseriee Kennedy.

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PODCAST: A Conversation About Opioid Litigation with Professor Adam Zimmerman

Earlier this year, in late June, an extraordinary class-action trial regarding the opioid crisis began in state court in Suffolk County. The plaintiffs, Suffolk and Nassau Counties and New York State, claim that the defendants – manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs and retail pharmacies that sold them – created a “public nuisance” by aggressively selling these drugs in New York while downplaying their dangers and the possibility of addiction.

There were so many parties and lawyers involved that trial opened in the first-floor auditorium of Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. The Hon. Jerry Garguilo is presiding over the case and has empaneled a jury. Under New York law, the plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on their public nuisance claim; the case is believed to be the first opioid trial of its kind to go before a jury. While a number of defendants settled before or over the course of the trial, the case is still going on as of mid-November, now in a courtroom in Suffolk County.

In early October, Professor Adam Zimmerman, a Professor at Loyola Law School and the author of a number of scholarly articles about class action suits, discussed the legal and policy issues raised by the opioid trial in Suffolk County with Associate Dean Rodger Citron. Their wide-ranging discussion will be of interest to anyone following the opioid litigation in Suffolk County and around the nation, as well anyone who teaches or is taking Torts and Civil Procedure.

Brought to you by the Touro Law Review

Our guest today is Professor Adam Zimmerman

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PODCAST: Personal Jurisdiction under the Roberts Supreme Court

Join us to learn about seminal personal jurisdiction cases and Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District.  The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Ford in October 2020.  As we await the Court’s decision, Professors Rodger Citron and Laura Dooley, who teach Civil Procedure, discuss the case with Professor Zablotsky, who teaches Torts.   

Brought to you by the Touro Law Review

source: suprmecourt.gov

Pennoyer v. NeffInternational Shoe.  Sound familiar? These seminal personal jurisdiction cases haunt the memories of first-year law students.  For litigators, personal jurisdiction matters well after your first semester of law school. 

Under Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme Court has taken an interest in personal jurisdiction doctrine.  Currently pending before the Court is Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District (“Ford”), involving specific personal jurisdiction doctrine.   

The Court heard oral argument in Ford in October 2020.  As we await the Court’s decision, Professors Rodger Citron and Laura Dooley, who teach Civil Procedure, met online to discuss the case with Professor Peter Zablotsky in a podcast sponsored by the Touro Law Review

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Service of Process – Redefining Traditional Methods of Service to Include Social Media

By Dennis J. McGrath, J.D. Class of 2017 Touro Law Review Senior Staff Member

Our legal system requires that proper service of process be conducted in order for the court to initially establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant. While each jurisdiction in state court has rules establishing proper service of process, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs cases filed in the United States district courts.[1]

In a lawsuit recently filed this past June in a U.S. District Court in California, the court determined that service by social media, namely a Twitter account, would satisfy the service of process requirements.[2] The plaintiffs were seeking damages against a Syrian national named Hajjaj bin Fahd al-Ajmi.[3] The plaintiffs were having a difficult time trying to locate the defendant in order to properly serve him personally.[4] Upon the realization that the defendant had an active account and large following on Twitter, the plaintiffs sought court authorization to serve the defendant via the Twitter account.[5]

The plaintiffs relied on rule 4(f)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which dictates that service to foreign defendants can be made by “any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice.”[6] The U.S. Magistrate hearing the motion, Judge Laurel Beeler, determined that the defendant did have an active Twitter account and that service by this method was likely to be effective.[7] It was her opinion that service by Twitter would satisfy the service of process requirements.[8]

The concept of using social media for service of process on a domestic defendant has produced mixed decisions as to whether this method is proper. In 2012, a New York Family Court allowed a father, who was seeking termination of child support but was unable to locate his ex-wife, to serve legal process through Facebook.[9] Support Magistrate Gliedman ruled that it was “impracticable” to serve the defendant personally and therefore, “despite the absence of a physical address, [Biscocho, plaintiff] does have a means by which he can contact [Antigua, defendant] . . . namely the existence of a social media account.”[10]

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York decided differently in a similar case. In Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. the plaintiff sought permission to serve the defendant by email and Facebook.[11] The court held that not enough proof had been provided that the defendant actively maintained the email or Facebook account in order to make a reliable method of service upon the defendant.[12] The court was also concerned about the potential for fraud when it stated, “anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or incomplete information.”[13] The court’s concern about social media being a reliable method of service is distinguishable from the other cases discussed, as those courts determined that social media was a reliable method only to reach those defendants after other traditional methods of service had failed.

While some courts seem to be embracing social media as a tool for service of process, the courts have been slow to embrace this new technology as a reliable method. The United States Supreme Court has held that due process requires that service of process be “reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”[14] In order to pass muster, a plaintiff must show that the use of social media is “reasonably calculated” to notify the defendant of the legal proceeding, and traditional methods of notification must have previously failed.

Currently, the courts are not liberally allowing the use of social media as a substitute for traditional methods of personal service. It appears that it is only being considered in cases where the traditional methods have proven ineffective or impracticable, and where social media seems to be the only remaining reliable option of notice.[15] A district court in the Southern District of New York wrote about service by social media saying “[H]istory teaches that, as technology advances and modes of communication progress, courts must be open to considering requests to authorize service via technological means of then-recent vintage, rather than dismissing them out of hand as novel.”[16] If the courts embrace this opinion, we will probably be seeing a broadening of what might be considered acceptable service of process beyond Facebook and Twitter in the years to come.

[1] Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.

[2] James Billington, You’ve been Served: Lawsuits Can Now Be Delivered Over Twitter, International Business Times (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/youve-been-served-lawsuits-can-now-be-delivered-over-twitter-1585344.

[3] St. Francis of Assisi v. Kuwait Finance House, et. al., Case No. 3:16-cv-3240-LB, 2016 WL 5725002 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016).

[4] Billington, supra note 2.

[5] Id.

[6] Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).

[7] Steven Nelson, Evildoers of Twitter Beware: You can now be Served in a Tweet, U.S. News & World Report (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/accused-terror-financier-can-be-served-lawsuit-via-twitter-judge-rules.

[8] Id.

[9]Julai Marsh et al., Judge OKs Serving Legal Papers Via Facebook, New York Post (Sept. 18, 2014)http://nypost.com/2014/09/18/judge-oks-serving-legal-papers-via-facebook/.

[10] Id.

[11] Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 WL 2086950 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

[15] St. Francis of Assisi, Case No. 3:16-cv-3240-LB, 2016 WL 5725002; Marsh, supra note 8.

[16] Federal Trade Comm. v. PCCare247, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013).