By Taurus Myhand
I. INTRODUCTION
Chatrie v. United States resolves a question the Supreme Court left open in Carpenter v. United States: whether law enforcement conducts a Fourth Amendment “search” when it compels a technology company to disclose location data drawn from millions of users rather than a single carrier’s records. The Court answers yes, holding that Google Location History is more revealing than cell-site data, that duration does not determine constitutional protection, and that the third-party doctrine does not reach data users experience as their own. Yet the decision resolves less than it appears to. By remanding the particularity question to the Fourth Circuit, the Court leaves geofence warrants—and the broader family of “reverse warrants” they inspired, including keyword searches, AI data demands, and mass video surveillance—without a governing standard for how narrowly such warrants must be drawn. Existing scholarship, including doctrinal mapping offered by amici in the case itself, treats this as a warrant-drafting problem to be solved through incremental particularity rules. This essay traces the case from the 2019 bank robbery through the Supreme Court’s decision, situates the ruling within the Carpenter line of precedent, and considers its implications for the broader universe of “reverse-search warrants,” including keyword searches, AI data requests, and video surveillance demands. It closes by previewing the author’s forthcoming dissertation, which argues that geofence and reverse-search technologies function as mechanisms of population-level social control rather than mere investigative tools.
Keywords: Fourth Amendment, geofence warrants, reverse warrants, digital privacy, third-party doctrine, mass surveillance, particularity requirement.
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